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Constitutional Law-
POWER OF CONGRESS TO INVESTIGATE
INDIRECT LOBBYING
Appellant, Executive Secretary of the Committee for Constitutional
Government, Inc., was convicted for failure to furnish the House Com-
mittee investigating lobbying activities' with the names of persons who
paid his Committee for the distribution of literature on current national
issues to persons or groups named by the contributor. The conviction was
reversed on the grounds that Congress had not authorized an investigation
of such distribution, since to have authorized it would have been uncon-
stitutional. The court reasoned that the First Amendment prevents Con-
gress from passing any legislation regulating these activities of appellant's
Committee, and where Congress cannot legislate, it cannot investigate.
Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 21
U.S.L. WEEK 3097 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1952).
The power of Congress to investigate is implied so far as it is necessary
and appropriate to the exercise of an express power.2 While the exact
scope of the investigatory power has never been defined, it is not unlimited.3
The courts have not restricted Congress to investigating subjects on which
legislation is actually being considered, but have held that an investiga-
tion is valid so long as constitutional legislation or other direct action could
1. This committee, commonly known as the Buchanan Committee, was created
by H.R. REs. 298, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), which reads in part: "The com-
mittee is authorized and directed to conduct a study and investigation of (1) all
lobbying activities intended to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legisla-
tion; . . ."
The information which appellant refused to give to the Buchanan Committee
was the names, addresses, and amounts of contributions of each person who paid
a total of $500 or more to the Committee for Constitutional Government between
January 1, 1947, and August 1, 1950. Appellant contended that payments to his or-
ganization were not contributions but purchases of books which were published and
distributed by the organization. Appellant was convicted by the District Court of
the District of Columbia of violating REv. STAT. § 102 (1878), as amended, 2 U.S.C.
§ 192 (1946), which provides that a witness before a congressional committee who
refuses to answer any question pertinent to the inquiry shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor. An affirmance of the instant decision by the Supreme Court on the grounds
of lack of pertinency would avoid the more interesting constitutional problem.
2. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
3. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). This is the only case in which
a congressional investigation has been held to have exceeded the power of Congress.
The Court held that inquiry into the financial affairs of a debtor of the United
States was judicial in nature and could not result in any valid legislation. On the
scope of the investigatory power generally see Gose, The Limits of Congressional
Investigating Power, 10 WASH. L. Rnv. 61, 138 (1935); Landis, Constitutional
Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation, 40 HAtv. L. REv. 153
(1926) ; Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Un-American Activities Committee,
47 Cot. L. REv. 416, 423 (1947) and authorities cited therein.
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result.4 The issue, then, is whether or not any valid legislation could result
from an inquiry concerning contributors to appellant's Committee.
Democratic government depends upon the free expression of public
opinion to a responsive legislature. Therefore it is important to keep the
channels of communication as free from restrictions as possible. Lobbying
contributes to the process of interpreting public opinion to legislatures;
yet lobbying may also endanger the legislative process by misinterpreting
public opinion and preventing an accurate identification of the public inter-
estY An attempt to meet the problem of lobbying has resulted in state and
federal laws aimed at disclosure rather than prohibition of lobbying activi-
ties. The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946 6 provides for the registration
of professional lobbyists 7 and disclosure of contributions of $500 or more
received by any person or group for lobbying purposes.8 State laws
typically require lobbyists to register and file expense accounts; many re-
quire disclosure of contributions.9 The theory behind laws compelling
disclosure is that the publicity resulting from disclosure will enable the
public and legislators to evaluate the possible bias of an expression of
opinion.10
The instant court draws a distinction between the attempt to influence
legislation by representations made directly to members or committees of
Congress, and the exertion of an indirect influence on Congress by swaying
public opinion." The court considers indirect methods, such as the dis-
semination of literature by the Committee for Constitutional Government,
to be outside the commonly accepted meaning of lobbying and beyond the
regulatory power of Congress. Yet the potential danger from pressure
groups is not limited to the coercion or corruption of legislators; modem
methods of manipulating public beliefs through all the media of mass com-
munication can, by bombarding the public with a distortion of facts, seri-
ously impede the formation of a rational public opinion.'12  Moreover, the
4. In upholding the validity of a congressional investigation, the Supreme Court
said, "Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be
materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit."
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 177 (1927).
5. See Note, Improving the Legislative Process: Federal Regulatio of Lobby-
ig, 56 YAI. L.J. 304, 309-310 (1947).
6. 60 STAT. 839-842, 2 U.S.C. §§261-270 (1946).
7. 60 STAT. 841, 2 U.S.C. § 267 (1946).
8. 60 STAT. 840, 2 U.S.C. § 264 (1946).
9. Zeller, State Regidation of Lobbying, 9 BooK oF THE STATEs 110 (1952).
10. See Logan, Lobbying, 144 ANNALs (Supp.) 68, 79 (1929).
11. Instant case at 174-175.
12. Special interests have long been making widespread use of methods of in-
fluencing legislation through the moulding of public opinion. One of the most in-
tensive of such campaigns was that of the public utilities lobby which spread its
propaganda through newspapers, school text-books, and speakers' bureaus. See SEN.
Doc, No. 92, pt. 71A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. passihn (1928). See generally Logan,
Lobbying, 144 ANNALS (Supp.) (1929) ; BLAISDELL, EcoNo Ic POWER AND POLITICAL
PRssu~Rs (TNEC Monograph 26, 1941).
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defining of lobbying to include only direct representations to Congress is
not supported by the legislative record, as the dissent points out.18
A serious constitutional question arises when an effort is made to
regulate the use of communications for propaganda. The dissemination of
ideas through books and pamphlets is within the freedom of press protec-
tion of the First Amendment.' 4 The standard of constitutionality charac-
teristically employed where an infringement of the First Amendment is at
issue is the clear and present danger test. The instant court uses that
standard and finds that no such danger was created by the Committee's
distribution of literature.' 5 Under the clear and present danger doctrine,
a restriction on freedom of expression which amounts to censorship of
ideas or proscription of essential means of communication' 0 is prohibited
unless it is aimed at a danger of substantive evil which Congress is em-
powered to prevent; -1 the danger must be serious 1s and immediate.19 That
a danger to the democratic functioning of the legislative process could be
the requisite substantive evil is indicated from an analogy to the applica-
tion of the clear and present danger doctrine to interference with the
13. Instant case at 182. A House committee investigating lobbying activities of
the National Association of Manufacturers in 1913 scrutinized the Association's
campaigning for the re-election or defeat of particular candidates for office. H.R.
REP. No. 113, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1913). Debate in 1935 on a bill to require
lobbyists of utility holding companies to register stressed the abuses of newspaper
editorials. 92 CONG. REc. 7046-7051 (1935). Congressional intent would seem to in-
clude indirect methods in the scope of the Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, which
provides that it shall be applicable to anyone who receives money to be used "to
influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or defeat of any legislation by the
Congress of the United States." 60 STAT. 841, 2 U.S.C. §266(b) (1946). The
Report of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, which reported this
bill substantially as passed, defines the scope of the bill to include "Those who do
not visit the Capitol but initiate propaganda from all over the country in the form
of letters and telegrams . . ." SEN. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1946).
A specific exemption in the Lobbying Act for newspapers or other regularly pub-
lished periodicals would seem to imply that printed matter other than regularly pub-
lished periodicals is within the purview of the Act. 60 STAT. 842, 2 U.S.C. § 267(a)
(1946). See generally Zeller, The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, 42 Am.
Por- Sci. REv. 239 (1948).
14. E.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
15. Instant case at 174. The court distinguishes the instant case from Barsky
v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948), in
which it held that the House Un-American Activities Committee was conducting
a valid investigation, on the grounds that the subject to which that committee ad-
dressed itself could be regulated despite the First Amendment because of the clear
and present danger created by communism.
16. In the limited situation involving prior discretionary approval for expres-
sion of views, the older doctrine of previous restraint has been relied upon to in-
validate the censorship, rather than the test of clear and present danger. Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) ; Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
17. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (dissenting
opinion).
18. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639
(1943).
19. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941). But cf. Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 510, 99 U. oF PA. L. REv. 407 (1951).
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judicial process. 20 The Supreme Court has asserted its right to protect
litigants from a newspaper's attempts to influence judicial action.2' The
irreparable harm which could result from injurious newspaper coverage of
a trial leads to the conclusion that such coverage can, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, be absolutely prohibited.2 The corresponding threat of lobby-
ing to the legislative process, however, would probably not justify complete
prohibition, since a free flow of ideas is vital to that process.
Even if it were determined that a sufficiently serious and immediate
danger does not exist to warrant regulation of this type of lobbying at
present, an investigation might still be permissible. Investigation must
precede legislation. That the investigating power has been defined so as
to include inquiry into not only subjects of current legislation but also
all areas of possible legislation, suggests that unless indirect lobbying could
not in the future create the kind of danger Congress is entitled to prevent,
an investigation could now be conducted.P Moreover, since fact-finding
is within the province of the legislative branch,24 it would seem anomalous
to prevent Congress from investigating to determine the existence of a clear
and present danger.
25
The Supreme Court on occasion uses a test of reasonableness ratier
than of clear and present danger, where the nature of the restriction on
free expression 2 or the nature of the power being exercised by the
sovereign 27 can justify the application of a more lenient standard. Restric-
tions which do not amount to censorship of ideas or proscription of essen-
tial means of communication, such as the requirement of a license for
20. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263-268 (1941); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 346-347 (1946) ; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947).
21. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 347 (1946).
22. See 1 CHAiE, GOVERNMENT ANDl MASS CoMMUNICAToNs, 384 et seq. (1947).
The fact that the question of prohibiting harmful reporting ordinarily arises in
connection with a summary proceeding for contempt of court probably increases the
courts' reluctance to affirm these restrictions on the press. See Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367, 373 (1947).
23. See note 4 supra.
24. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 et seq. (1927).
25. This is the argument of the dissent. Instant case at 185. For an argument
that Congress can conduct an investigation in order to determine whether or not it
has jurisdiction to legislate, see Morgan, Congressional Investigations and Judicial
Review: Kilbourn v. Thompson Revisited, 37 CALIF. L. Rxv. 556 (1949). Consider
also the power of Congress to investigate in order to amend the Constitution.
26. Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COL.
L. REv. 313 (1952) ; Antieau, The Ride of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of its
Applicability, 48 MicH. L. REv. 811 (1950). The Supreme Court has said that the
danger test is not applicable to cases of partial abridgement of freedom, in uphold-
ing the requirement of non-Communist affidavits as a prerequisite for a labor union's
receiving the benefits of the National Labor Relations Act. American Communica-
tions Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396-400 (1950). Exclusion from the
privilege of second-class mail for failure to register certain specified information
with the Postmaster General has similarly been held not to abridge the First
Amendment. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
27. See Comment, 100 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1244, 1245-1246 (1952).
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parades 28 or a fee and badge for literature salesmen,2 9 have been upheld
as reasonable police regulations. So also the Hatch Act's prohibition of
political activity by government employees was held valid as a reasonable
exercise of Congress' power over the public service.30 Where a partial
restraint was incident to the exercise of Congress' power over commerce 3 '
or a state's control of the public service,82 the clear and present danger test
has likewise been abandoned for one of reasonableness. The implied power
of Congress to protect the legislative process 33 from abuse would seem to
be as vital as power over the public service or commerce. However, even
if a regulation does not initially prohibit expression, if failure to comply
results in prohibition, the Court today may apply a clear and present danger
standard.3 4 This suggests that application of the reasonableness doctrine
to test a regulation of lobbying would be limited to a statute requiring only
registration or publicity of lobbyists, with no prohibition of lobbying as
punishment for failure to comply.
In other areas publicity has been required where prohibition might be
invalid, and the limited nature of the restriction has been taken into con-
sideration in upholding constitutionality. A New York statute requiring
oath-bound organizations to file a roster of members and officers has, been
upheld.3 5 In sustaining the provisions of the act requiring registration of
foreign agents and propagandists, the court looked to the lack of suppres-
sion involved in registration, instead of applying the clear and present
danger test which might have been met.3 6 Various state and federal elec-
tion laws require disclosures similar to those likely to be exacted of lobby-
ists. The federal requirement of statements of receipts and expenditures
of voluntary political committees has been held to be within the power of
Congress.3 7 State statutes requiring unions to file election expense re-
ports 3s and that publishers of certain political circulars be disclosed 39 have
28. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
29. City of Manchester v. Leiby, 117 F.2d 661 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
562 (1941).
30. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
31. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
32. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
33. It has also been suggested that the taxing or postal powers be used to re-
quire disclosure of groups attempting to influence public opinion. To SECURE
THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PREsiDENT's COmmITrEE ox CIVIL RIGHTS
164 (1947).
34. Where union organizers were required to register before soliciting union
memberships, although registration was open to all, the Court applied the clear and
present danger test and found a violation of the First Amendment on the grounds
that failure to register would result in a prohibition of speaking. Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945). Similarly, the district court held unconstitutional those sec-
tions of the Federal Lobbying Act of 1946 relating to records of contributions be-
cause the penalty for violation was a prohibition of lobbying for three years.
National Association of Manufacturers v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510 (D.D.C.),
vacated as moot, 73 Sup. Ct. 31 (1952).
35. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
36. United States v. Peace Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951).
37. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (no First Amendment
issue was raised).
38. Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 69 N.E.2d 115
(1946).
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not been considered violations of freedom of expression. A narrow line at
best separates expenditures made prior to an election to aid a candidate
from corresponding expenditures made over a period of time to direct
public opinion toward the same result. The parallel danger of anonymity
in both cases would seem to justify similar remedies, and disclosure in both
cases is subject to the criticism that it will be a disproportionate deterrent
to the support of minority views. Ordinarily full disclosure of the truth
is the essence of the First Amendment, but the danger is that in times
of intolerance supporters of unpopular causes may be unfairly prejudiced
if they are deprived of the protection afforded by anonymity.
The scope of the congressional investigatory power at present is prob-
lematical. The limits of the legislative power have expanded greatly
since the early case of Kilbourn v. Thompson, which remains the only
decision invalidating a congressional investigation,40 and some writers be-
lieve that that decision does not represent today a valid restraint on the in-
vestigating power.41 It is difficult to say, as the court has here, that no con-
stitutional legislation or other direct action could result from this particular
inquiry. To protect fundamental rights, it would seem logical to prohibit
Congress from compelling by an investigation disclosures which it could not
secure by legislation. But if even the freedoms of expression can be cur-
tailed in the presence of a clear and present danger, or subjected to reason-
able partial restraints at any time, it seems equally desirable to allow Con-
gress to secure sufficient facts to determine whether or not the danger or
need for reasonable restraint is present. Should Congress undertake an
investigation which is clearly irrelevant to any of its direct powers, the
validity of the inquiry would be highly dubious. But the desirability of
learning the truth as a basis for legislation and the improbability that the
Bill of Rights would necessarily be violated by any resultant legislation
are considerations which point up the impracticality of the limit to con-
gressional investigatory power set up by the instant case.
Corporations-
CONSIDERATION FOR STOCK OPTIONS GIVEN
AS INCENTIVES TO CORPORATE PERSONNEL
Defendant corporation through its nine member board of directors
granted an option to purchase shares of stock to seven executives, six of
whom were also members of the board. The plan provided that a portion
of the corporation's unissued stock be set aside under an option to the
39. Commonwealth v. Evans, 156 Pa. Super. 321, 40 A.2d 137 (1944). See also
A. CODE tit. 17, § 282 (1940) (prohibiting distribution of printed matter backing
candidates and not containing the names of the distributors); Wis. STAT. c. 12,
§ 11 (1947) (requiring a statement from an individual spending over $50 in an elec-
tion campaign); N.Y. ELEzrozT LAW § 322(2) (requiring statements from anyone
paying anything in an election except to a political committee) ; see Matter of Lance,
55 Misc. 13, 106 N.Y. Supp. 211 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
40. See note 3 .rupra.
41. Landis, supra note 3, at 214; Morgan, smpra note 25.
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designated beneficiaries who could purchase the stock at a price not lower
than 95% of the highest price which the company's stock commanded on
the New York Stock Exchange on the date the option was given. The
term of the options could not exceed seven years and could only be exer-
cised so long as the optionee remained in the employe of the corporation.'
The plan was ratified by a majority of the stockholders.2 Subsequently
the plaintiff, a minority stockholder, entered suit to cancel the option agree-
ments upon the dual theory that the options were given without considera-
tion and were therefore unlawful gifts of corporate property, and that such
options were destructive of the pre-emptive rights of stockholders in respect
to unissued stock.3 Counsel stipulated that the directors believed the plan
was in the company's benefit. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that
summary judgment for defendant should not be granted, but that trial
should be had on the issue of whether or not there was sufficient considera-
tion for the option plan.4  Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660
(Del. 1952), aff'd on rehearing, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 2230 (Nov. 14, 1952).
The court distinguished between an option plan and the actual transfer
of stock under the plan, and thus avoided the effect of § 2046 of the Dela-
ware Corporation Code 3 which provides that in the purchase of stock for
services the judgment of the directors as to the value of the labor shall be
conclusive in the absence of fraud. Inasmuch as no transfer occurs when
a stock option plan is instituted, the inapplicability of the statute to that
transaction makes possible an independent judicial examination of the
adequacy of consideration for the plan itself, even though the same factors
showing consideration may be involved both then and at the time when the
transfer actually occurs. Thus the practical effect of the distinction is to
circumvent the statute which would otherwise limit judicial review. This
approach seems necessary to protect dilution of stockholders' equities and
1. However, an optionee could exercise his option if he voluntarily resigned with
the consent of the board, or if he became totally disabled, or if he retired upon
reaching the normal retirement age under the corporation's plan of retirement. In-
stant case at 661. The stock option plan was allegedly designed to induce the bene-
ficiaries to remain in the corporation's employ.
2. Where a gift or waste of corporate assets is concerned, the majority of stock-
holders cannot effectively ratify as against the protest of a minority holder. Stock-
holder ratification in these circumstances must be unanimous to be effective. See
Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 590 (1933). Following the rule formulated therein
are Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 306, 60 A.2d 106, 109 (1948);
Eshelman v. Keenan, 21 Del. Ch. 259, 263, 187 Atl. 25, 27 (1936).
3. This comment will not deal with the question of pre-emptive rights in rela-
tion to stock option plans. For that aspect see instant case at 667; Yasik v. Wachtel,
25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (1941); Kingston v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America,
11 Del. Ch. 258, 101 Atl. 898 (1917). For general discussion of stockholder's pre-
emptive rights see Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights, 38 YALE LJ. 563
(1929); Drinker, The Preimptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New
Shares, 43 HARV. L. REv. 586 (1930).
4. On the same day the court in a similar case invalidated a stock option plan
where it contained no conditions reasonably insuring benefit to the corporation.
Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 90 A.2d 652 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952). See also
Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 91 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 1952).
5. DEL REv. CODE §2046 (1935).
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avoid the risk of over-compensation to corporate executives.0 That the
court may have had this purpose in mind is indicated by the fact that the
statutory requirement in the instant case could have been disposed of in
accordance with an earlier interpretation of § 2046 by the Delaware courts,
7
holding invalid as incompetent the evaluation by directors of their own
services.
Stock option or other incentive plans are not illegal per se; 8 they will
be invalidated only when the court finds that they result in a gift of cor-
porate assets,9 or waste through bad faith or fraud.' 0 The options must
be granted in exchange for valuable consideration according to what is said
to be the ordinary principles of contract law. 1 The difficulty arises in the
evaluation of incentive compensation and the services sought to be ob-
tained; these must bear a reasonable relation to each other in order to
constitute valid consideration.'2 In determining the adequacy of con-
sideration, the courts have ordinarily relied upon the business judgment of
the corporate directors 13 except where the directors themselves are involved
in the transaction.' 4 While the instant case falls within the exception,'S
the decision indicates that the business judgment rule itself will be limited
in the future in the Delaware courts. A good faith exercise of business
judgment will not preclude an examination into its reasonableness, even
though the factors which a court considers in making such a determination
are those which presumably would be employed by the directors. The fac-
tors fall into three general classes, the first of which relates to benefit to
the corporation. Past services of personnel to whom options are granted
do not constitute consideration for such grants,' but a promise to continue
in employment will support them.'7  The extent to which an option may be
6. In the absence of self-dealing, see e.g., Sterling Loan & Investment Co. v.
Litch, 75 Cal. 34, 223 Pac. 757 (1924), minority stockholders have faced extreme
judicial reluctance to declare an officer's compensation excessive. See e.g., Rogers
v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Heller v. Boylan, 263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d
131 (1st Dep't. 1941). The instant case in an important area will make this ex-
amination possible.
7. Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 Atl. 224 (1921), aff'd sub norn.
Lofland v. Cahall, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 118 Atl. 1 (1922).
8. McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940).
9. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 590 (1933).
10. Wight v. Heublin, 238 Fed. 321, 324 (4th Cir. 1916).
11. 5 FrTcaa, CYcLOPEDIA oF CoRPoRAxlONS § 2142 (Rev. ed. 1952).
12. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933) ; Claimitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 158
F.2d 687 (2nd Cir. 1947); Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343 (D. Del. 1948);
Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (1948); Holthusen
v. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
13. E.g., Claimitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., supra note 12; Moore v. Linahan, 117
F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1941); McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., supra note 8;
Wyles v. Campbell, supra note 12.
14. Lofland v. Cahall, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 118 Atl. 1 (1922).
15. Instant case at 663.
16. Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Ky. 1939),
aff'd, 127 F.2d 291 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 639 (1942) ; In re Fergus Falls
Woolen Mills Co., 127 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1942); Von Arnim v. American Tube
Works, 188 Mass. 515, 74 N.E. 680 (1905).
17. Holthusen v. Budd Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 488 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
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exercised should depend upon the length and value of the optionee's
prospective employment. Thus where the optionee is under no obligation
to continue in the corporation's employ, the option is likely to be in-
validated.' 8 In many cases the recent prosperity of the corporation due
to the efforts of the optionee has been used as an indication of his future
worth.19 The second group of factors affecting the adequacy of considera-
tion concerns the value actually received by the beneficiary. Here, the
relation of the market value of the stock to the price at which optionees
may obtain it is a primary consideration.2° The courts also consider the
amount of compensation which an optionee receives apart from the option.
Where his salary or share of the profits is substantial, it is unlikely that
incentive in the form of a stock option is necessary. 21 In determining
sufficiency of compensation a comparison with the remuneration of officials
in like positions in similar businesses may be of assistance.2 2 Into the third
classification fall the means by which stock option plans are contrived.
These have great influence upon the courts so far as they indicate the bona
fides of the option plan. It is obviously more difficult to justify option
schemes when they are made by directors who are at the same time
beneficiaries than when the stockholders themselves initiate the plan.p
The holding in the instant case is likely to result in a closer scrutiny
of stock option agreements by the courts. Such a judicial examination
considerably diminishes the risk of dissipation of corporate funds, however
much in good faith, by the directors. In addition, it places greater respon-
sibility on the courts to supervise performance of managers' and directors'
fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders.2 4 The problem may be currently
18. Holthusen v. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1943) ; see Comment,
32 CALIF. L. REv. 88 (1944).
19. E.g., Wight v. Heublein, 238 Fed. 321 (4th Cir. 1916); Koplar v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1937). In this respect stock option
plans are similar to ordinary grants of bonuses to executives. Although they are
in reality rewards for past services, theoretically at least they are given in considera-
tion of continued services. See 5 FzrcHER, CYcLOPEDIA OF CoRpoRATioNs § 2143
(Rev. ed. 1952).
20. Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 90 A.2d 652 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952);
Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd iner., 265 App. Div.
919, 39 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd mern., 292 N.Y. 554, 54 N.E.2d 683
(1944).
21. Balch v. Investor's Royalty Co., 7 F. Supp. 420 (D.D.C. 1934); Rosenthal
v. Burry Biscuit Corp., supra note 2.
22. Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., snpra note 16; Church v. Harnit, 35
F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1939) ; Stratis v. Anderson, 254 Mass. 536, 150 N.E. 832 (1926).
23. Winkleman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960, 978 (S.D.N.Y.
1942); Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd, 263 App. Div.
815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1st Dep't 1941). One case has even held that a bonus to the
controlling member of a board of directors was invalid regardless of its reasonable-
ness. Kalischer v. Sussman, 314 Ill. 383, 41 N.E.2d 239 (1942). Contra: Wiseman
v. Musgrave, 309 Mich. 523, 16 N.W.2d 60 (1944). The amount of documentary
evidence which a corporation can produce is of course vital to the showing of an
arms length transaction. Where clear open records of all agreements have been kept
the court will tend to rely on the business discretion of the directors. See Diamond
v. Davis, supra note 20.
24. See BALLANTINE, COa'ORATIONS 194 (Rev. ed. 1946).
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all the more pressing in light of recent tax legislation which provides a
motive for granting stock options 2 5 The full practical significance of this
decision will only be determined by the character of the inquiry into the
option plan on remand, but it suggests that Delaware has adopted a far
more critical approach to stock option arrangements.
Eminent Domain-
CONDEMNATION OF BLIGHTED AREAS FOR PRIVATE
COMMERCIAL REDEVELOPMENT HELD INVALID
AS TAKING FOR PRIVATE USE
Acting under a Florida statute authorizing "Redevelopment by Private
Enterprise," 1 defendant housing authority prepared a plan, which was
approved by the City Council of Daytona Beach, to acquire by purchase
or eminent domain a plot containing five non-residential buildings and
seventy residential buildings, the majority of which had been found to be
dangerous to the occupants and unfit for rehabilitation. The area was to be
cleared and then sold to private purchasers for commercial and light in-
dustrial uses on condition that the development and uses of the property
conform to the housing authority plan. A present owner of some of the
property involved sued to enjoin the execution of the plan on the grounds
that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the provisions of the Florida Constitution guaranteeing
the right of private property and prohibiting the taking of it without just
compensation.2 The Supreme Court of Florida held that the statute and
the plan violated the Florida Constitution because the commercial and in-
dustrial uses for private profit were not a public use or purpose, and the
incidental public benefit did not warrant the use of the power of eminent
domain. Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952).
There have been two theories regarding the requirement of a public
use. The older and narrower view stipulated a use by the public or a right
of the public to use or enjoy the property taken.8 The more modem view
allows a use restricted to private persons as long as there is a definite
social advantage to the community, 4 and has been applied in upholding
city slum clearance projects for the erection of housing for low income
25. Int. Rev. Code § 130(a) provides under certain conditions for the non-
taxability as ordinary income of shares acquired pursuant to options. See SANDERs,
EFFECrs OF TAXATIOx ox ExEcuTivzs 123 (1951).
1. Laws of Fla. 1945, c. 23077, as amended, Laws of Fla. 1949, c. 26362.
2. FLA. CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 29; id., Declaration of Rights §§ 1, 12.
3. 2 NICHOLS, EMINEr DOMAIN 430 (3d ed., Sackman and Van Brunt, 1950)
(cases collected).
4. 2 id. at 433.
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families.0 The validity of slum clearance as a public purpose is not destroyed
by the mere fact that condemned property is thereafter conveyed to private
parties, instead of being let by governmental agencies,0 nor is it destroyed
by the fact that the private parties, to whom the land is subsequently sold,
use the property for private profit by erecting office buildings,7 by con-
structing business and industrial plants,s or by renting apartments.9
The instant case is the first dealing with urban redevelopment to hold
that a subsequent sale to private enterprise created a taking for private use.
In view of its earlier approval of the renting of houses to low income
families by housing authorities, 10 the Florida court in this case did not re-
quire a use by the public under the old rule but sought instead to prevent
the public benefit test from being extended to include profit-making enter-
prises. Until this decision modern courts have considered the immediate
purpose of the taking-slum clearance-as the primary purpose and as a
sufficient public use. The subsequent purpose, creation of low income
housing or of locations for private enterprise, has been held incidental,
ancillary, or unimportant." An Illinois case has held that "achievement
of the redevelopment of slum and blight areas . . . constitutes a public
use and public purpose, regardless of the use which may be made of the
property after the redevelopment has been achieved." 12 In the instant
case the court by its denunciation of sales to private enterprise dealt only
with the later purpose of the redevelopment plan. Such an analysis ignores
the initial public benefit derived from slum clearance in fostering cleanliness,
reducing crime and immorality, raising values of taxable property, reducing
fire hazards and lessening disease.' 8
5. N.Y.C. Housing Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936);
Spahn v. Stewart, 268 Ky. 97, 103 S.W.2d 651 (1937); Marvin v. Housing Auth.
of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938) ; Dornan v. Phila. Housing Auth.,
331 Pa. 209, 200 Atl. 834 (1938); Romano v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 123
N.J.L. 428, 10 A.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
6. Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1946);
Opinion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 343, 48 So.2d 757 (1950) ; Rowe v. Housing Auth.
of Little Rock, 249 S.W.2d 551 (Ark. 1952); Chicago Land Clearance Con. v.
White, 411 Ill. 310, 104 N.E.2d 236 (1952); In re Slum Clearance, 331 Mich. 714,
50 N.W.2d 340 (1951) ; Murray v. LaGuardia, 291 N.Y. 320, 52 N.E.2d 884 (1943) ;
Belovsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947).
7. Schenck v. Pittsburgh, 364 Pa. 31, 70 A.2d 612 (1950).
8. Ajootian v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, 91 A.2d 21 (RI. 1952);
Nashville Housing Auth. v Nashville, 192 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W.2d 946 (1951).
9. Amalgamated Housing Corp. v. Kelly, 193 N.Y. Misc. 961, 82 N.Y.S.2d
577 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
10. Lott v. City of Orlando, 142 Fla. 338, 196 So. 313 (1940) ; Marvin v. Hous-
ing Auth. of Jacksonville, 133 Fla. 590, 183 So. 145 (1938).
11. In re Slum Clearance, 331 Mich. 714, 50 N.W.2d 340 (1951) ; Amalgamated
Housing v. Kelly, 193 N.Y. Misc. 961, 82 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Belovsky
v. Redevelopment Auth., 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947) ; Opinion to the Governor,
76 R.I. 249, 69 A.2d 531 (1949); Nashville Housing Auth. v. Nashville, 192 Tenn.
103, 237 S.W.2d 946 (1951).
12. Zurn v. Chicago, 389 Ill. 114, 129, 59 N.E.2d 18, 25 (1945).
13. See Nashville Housing Auth. v. Nashville, 192 Tenn. 103, 237 S.W.2d 946
(1951).
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Should the states be restricted to the police power, as the Florida
Supreme Court suggests, minimum standards for buildings 14 and amortiza-
tion of nonconforming uses 11 could be imposed, but the police power is
more efficient as a social instrument for zoning unblighted areas. The use
of eminent domain is necessary in aid of the primary task of land assembly
and clearance in the larger process of blight elimination and rehabilitation.
Owners are loathe and perhaps unable to make material improvements upon
single properties while those adjoining remain unimproved.' 6 The third
alternative of voluntary land assembly is effectively obstructed by title
defects and holdouts of minority owners.17 Without eminent domain, there-
fore, redevelopment fails to achieve some of its most important goals; more-
over, without private enterprise, eminent domain will be ineffective in
extending city planning to commercial and industrial sections because,
at present, municipal ownership of the sites of urban businesses is neither
feasible financially nor desirable politically. The vagueness of the concept
of public use has given eminent domain a flexibility which has enabled the
courts to contract and expand the doctrine in response to changing social
conditions and goals.' The mere existence of slums and urban congestion
makes plain the public purpose in their removal and demands an expansion
of eminent domain for industry and commerce as well as housing.' 9
Immigrtion-
DUE PROCESS REQUIRES RELEASE OF EXCLUDED
ALIEN WHO IS UNREASONABLY DETAINED
The relator, an excluded alien incapable of securing admission to any
other country,' had been detained on Ellis Island for twenty-one months
14. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Blitch v.
City of Ocala, 142 Fla. 612, 195 So. 406 (1940); York v. Hargadine, 142 Minn.
219, 171 N.W. 773 (1919); Jackson v. Bell, 143 Tenn. 452, 226 S.W. 207 (1920).
See generally, Note, 7 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 520 (1939).
15. See Note, 9 U. OF CE. L. REv. 477 (1942).
16. See EBENSTEIN, THE LAw OF PUBLIC HOUSING 68, 69 (1940); Robbins,
Common Problems it Rehabilitatior Procedures in WALKER, UaN BLIGHT AND
SLUMS 203 (1938).
17. Robbins, Problems in Land Assembly in WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS
175 (1938).
18. A stiffening of the requirements which occurred in the nineteenth century
is being succeeded by a freer use in solving urban problems today. See 2 NIcHoLS,
EMINENT DoMAIx 438 (3d ed., Sackman and Van Brunt 1950) ; Nichols, The Mean-
ing of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Doinain, 20 B.U.L. REv. 615, 617 (1940).
19. The British solution of purchase by the government of the development rights
of all the land in Great Britain has given the authorities there three weapons by
which to control land development according to the plans of local authorities: 1)
granting or denial of permission to build; 2) a charge for repurchase of the right to
develop; 3) the free use of eminent domain. HAA, LAND PLANNING LAw IN A
FREE Socl=rY (1951).
1. The Government twice unsuccessfully attempted to deport the relator to
France. The alien himself failed in attempts to gain entry to some twelve other
countries and the Government was incapable of negotiating his return to Hungary.
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pending deportation.2  The exclusion was pursuant to regulations 3 per-
mitting the Attorney General on the basis of confidential information, the
disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest, to exclude
without hearing an alien considered a security risk. The district court
expressed its willingness to hear in camera any information of such a con-
fidential nature that its disclosure would be a serious breach of security,
but held that it would order the alien's enlargement unless the Government
justified further detention. 4  The court of appeals affirmed, with one dis-
sent. United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 964 (2d Cir),
cert. granted, 73 S. Ct. 25 (1952).
Prior to the McCarran Act 5 the federal district courts in expulsion
cases had developed the power upon writ of habeas corpus to release an
alien who had been detained an unreasonable time, once it became apparent
that a warrant for deportation could not be effectuated.0 A similar power
had also been exercised in exclusion situations on at least two occasions
prior to the present case.7  Section 23 of Title 1 of the McCarran Acts
amounted to a qualified legislative codification of the procedure developed
in expulsion cases in its provision for the release of an alien against whom
an order of deportation has been outstanding for more then six months.
Exclusion cases, however, not being warrant deportation proceedings, do
not come within this provision. On the basis of a power analogous to
that developed by the courts prior to the McCarran Act the court of
appeals in the present case affirmed the enlargement order on due process
grounds.9
The Government had contended that "an alien applying for admission
into the United States has no constitutional rights. .. .," 10 The claim
2. Deportation is not used here as a synonym for expulsion, although such use
is quite usual. See ex parte Domingo Corypus, 6 F.2d 336 (W.D. Wash. 1925).
The synonymous use of deportation and expulsion has led to great confusion. See
United States ex rel. Camezon v. District Director of I. & N., 105 F. Supp. 32
(S.D.N.Y. 1952). It is best to limit the use of deportation to denote the transporta-
tive process following either expulsion or exchAyion. Such usage has been here
followed.
3. 8 CoDE FED. REos. 175.57 (1949). The validity of the regulations was up-
held in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
4. 101 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). The power of the federal courts to release
from custody an alien who has been detained an unreasonably long time is the power
to enlarge and not to admit to bail. United States ex rel. Chu Leung v. Shaughnessy,
88 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
5. The Internal Security Act of 1950. 64 STAT. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781
(Supp. 1951).
6. A discussion of this power and its development may be found in United
States ex rel. Janavaris v. Nicolls, 47 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1942).
7. In re Krajcirovic, 87 F. Supp. 379 (D. Mass. 1949) ; Staniszewski v. Watkins,
80 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
8. 64 STAT. 1010 (1950), 8 U.S.C. § 156(b) (Supp. 1951).
9. Instant case at 967. The court said, "To continue an alien's confinement beyond
that moment when deportation becomes patently impossible is to deprive him of his
liberty."
10. Brief for Appellant, p. 15. Compare the view of Judge L. Hand, dissenting
in the instant case, that an alien seeking entry is charged with the knowledge that
he might be excluded and have to seek refuge elsewhere, and that should he be
permitted ashore pendente lite, the Government may give him whatever refuge it
chooses.
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relies essentially upon the holding in Knauff v. Shaughnessy 11 that an
exclusion based upon a nonreviewable executive order was not violative
of due process. This holding was consistent with the basic theoretical
principles underlying the constitutionality of our immigration laws. The
Supreme Court has held it an accepted maxim of international law that
every sovereign may control or forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
dominion.' 2  The power to expel is based upon the same foundation as
that to exclude, and indeed they are "but parts of . . .the same power." 18
This power may be exercised entirely through executive officers.14 With
respect to expulsion the Court has deviated from these principles by re-
quiring a fair hearing in good faith.' 5 Although inconsistent with the
basic theory, this approach is an adjustment to the belief that a resident
alien should be accorded greater protection than a non-resident. The
authorities relied on in establishing this standard were interestingly
enough exclusion cases in which by a claim of citizenship the excluded
individual questioned the jurisdiction of the executive.' 6 When cited in
support of a fair hearing in expulsion cases the constitutional significance
of this jurisdictional aspect has been conveniently overlooked.' 7 With
respect to the determination of a claim of citizenship the Court also has
made an unexplained distinction between expulsion and exclusion. While
an excluded person is entitled to a fair hearing in good faith to determine
his citizenship,' 8 a resident facing expulsion may have a de novo judicial
trial.' 9 Although the requirements of due process vary irrationally,20 in
11. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
12. Nishimura Ekui v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Chae Chan Ping
v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1888).
13. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893).
14. See note 13 supra. Congress has at times seen fit to bring these purely
executive determinations within the judicial power as it did under the Chinese Ex-
clusion Law. See United States, Petitioner, 194 U.S. 194 (1904).
15. Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460 (1912); United States ex tel.
Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22
(1939) ; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
16. Low Wah Suey, supra note 15 depends upon Tang Turn v. Edsell, 223 U.S.
673 (1912), Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908), and United States
v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905). Vajtauer v. Commissioner, smpra note 15, cites
Chin Yow v. United States, stpra, and Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454
(1920). Kessler v. Streckler, supra note 15, cites Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 273
(1912), and Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924), each of which in turn depend upon
jurisdictional exclusion cases. Bridges v. Wixon, supra note 15 cites Tisi v. Tod,
stpra, and Vajtauer v. Commissioner, supra.
17. If a claim of citizenship is sustained the theoretical basis of the validity
of a purely executive order is no longer applicable. Only in this area does the
jurisdictional fact doctrine remain vital. See DAvis, ADmNisRAIv= LAw 537, 920
(1951). Its vigorous survival here is tacit recognition 'of the inadequacy of the
due process standards currently employed.
18. Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908).
19. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922).
20. See United States ex rel. Medeiros v. Watkins, 166 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1948).
Judge Frank in his dissent expressed his shock at the realization that "a person
born in the United States, who had lived here continuously, would, by the mere
circumstance of taking a voluntary business trip outside the country, deprive himself
1952]
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both cases constitutional protection is afforded. This fact tends to reveal
the illogic of the Government's claim that because due process in ex-
clusion is satisfied by a non-reviewable executive order, the excluded alien
is not entitled to any constitutional protections. Indeed, even the state-
ment in Knauff and the previous exclusion cases 21 that any procedure
Congress prescribes is due process must mean that an alien has some
measure of constitutional protection, since to speak of a procedure afford-
ing due process is irrelevant until it is agreed that the party is protected
under the Constitution. Property rights of non-resident aliens have pre-
viously been granted Fifth'Amendment protection.2 2  Constitutional rights
are thus not dependent on residence. Furthermore, the Court has placed
constitutional limitations on the sovereign national power theory by hold-
ing that the power to imprison may not be exercised through executive
officials.
23
Accordingly, in an exclusion case, when the detention no longer
promises to effectuate a deportation, the court must inquire into the rea-
sonableness of the detention. By an analogy to the McCarran Act the
instant case implies that a detention of less than six months would not be
considered unreasonable 24 In characterizing a detention as reasonable,
factors in addition to the length of the detention have been examined. In
the present case the Court considered the possible effect of the enlarge-
ment upon the country's security, and bona fide but unsuccessful attempts
by both the alien and the Government to terminate the detention by seek-
ing the alien's entry to other countries. 25  Prior cases examined the
of a judicial determination of his rights to return to this country." In Carmichael
v. Delaney, 170 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1948), the court expressed its belief that residence,
not the mere form of the proceeding, is the controlling factor. (The appellee resided
in the United States for 30 years and had in war-time joined the merchant marine
service. On returning from the war theater he was excluded. The court sustained
his right to a de nwvo trial.) Perhaps in light of the Nationality Act of 1940 § 503,
54 STAT. 1171 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 903 (1946), this distinction loses some force. See
United States ex rel. Chu Leung v. Shaughnessy, 176 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1949).
21. E.g., United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263 (1905); Nishimura Ekui
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
22. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931); Disconto
Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570 (1908).
23. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
24. But cf. United States ex rel. Camezon v. District Director of I. & N., 105
F. Supp. 32 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), where the court suggests that the enactment
of a law regarding expelled aliens is no reason to believe that Congress had a similar
intent toward excluded aliens.
25. An alien may only be deported to the "country whence he came." 58 STAT.
816 (1944), 8 U.S.C. § 154 (1946); Wah v. Shaughnessy, 190 F.2d 488 (2d Cir.
1951). This has been judicially interpreted to include either the country from which
the alien embarked to the United States or the country of his citizenship. United
States ex rel. Consola v. Karnuth, 63 F. Supp. 727 (W.D.N.Y. 1951). It does not
include the country of nativity. Bellaskus v. Crossman, 164 F.2d 412 (5th Cir.
1947). An alien's release in expulsion situations may not be avoided by deportation
to a place not permitted by statute. Ex parte Perkov, 45 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal.
1942). The district court in the instant case suggested that if the alien would not
accept deportation to a country other than "whence he came" it would consider any
detention reasonable. Enlargement is thus available only if further detention cannot
otherwise be avoided.
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nature of previous service to the United States,O the prior criminal record
of the alien,27 the burden of confinement both upon the alien and on other
possible innocent parties,28 and the existence of a state of war.29 In the
instant case the Government in effect contended that when an exclusion
is based upon the allegation that the alien is a "security risk," any detention
must be characterized as reasonable. Such a characterization would be
the equivalent of a denial of a review. The Government further argued
that in light of Knauff v. Shaughnessy the courts are powerless to con-
sider the basis of the exclusion, even for the purpose of determining the
reasonableness of the detention.80 But the court clarified Knauff by hold-
ing that while a court may not examine the basis of the exclusion order
as such, it may require a showing that the detention is reasonable even if
the Government, to carry the burden of proof, must reveal its evidence.
When an exclusion order, based as it might be upon nonreviewable
executive determinations, becomes the basis of a possibly indefinite con-
finement, it is necessary that there be some technique for judicial review.
The flexibility inherent in the judicial determination of the reasonableness
of the detention protects the individual from extended incarceration while
at the same time it protects the country from genuine breaches of security.
Taxation-
DEDUCTION OF UNREASONABLE INTEREST
PAYMENTS TO WIFE PERMITTED
In 1941 taxpayer, a resident of Delaware, in order to pay off an
indebtedness of $8500, borrowed that amount from his wife, giving her
his bond due in one year and bearing interest at 5%o per annum. In 1943,
for nominal consideration, taxpayer and his wife agreed that in lieu of
interest on the debt the wife would receive 25% of the net profits of tax-
payer's retail business. These payments to the wife amounted to approxi-
mately $6,900, $7,700 and $10,000 for the years 1943, 1944 and 1945
respectively. In computing their taxable incomes for these years, these
amounts were reported as income by the wife and deducted by taxpayer
as interest paid. The Commissioner allowed interest deductions from
taxpayer's gross income only in the amount of 5% of the principal sum
of $8,500. In the suit for recovery of the deficiencies assessed, a verdict
was directed for taxpayer on the ground that there was no evidence of
lack of bona fide debtor-creditor relationship between taxpayer and his
26. Staniszewski v. Watins, 80 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (Merchant sea-
men for 38 years).
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. (Steamship company that hired the alien without knowledge of his
past history had to pay his support while on Ellis Island.)
29. United States ex rel. Janavaris v. Nicolls, 47 F. Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 194?).
30. Brief for Appellant, pp. 11, 14.
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wife as a result of the 1943 agreement. The district court held as a
matter of law that the payments of 25% of net profits could be deducted
as payments of interest. Alternatively, the court held that the profits
paid to the wife were taxable to her as her share of a joint venture, and
thus were excluded from taxpayer's gross income.' The court of appeals
affirmed on the ground that, "There is no requirement in section 23(b) 2
that deductible interest be ordinary and necessary or even that it be reason-
able." 3 The alternative holding was also affirmed. Dorzback v. Collison .
195 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1952).
The arrangement which resulted from the 1943 agreement has char-
acteristics of both a debtor-creditor relationship and a joint venture in
the nature of a limited partnership, even though under Delaware law it
would not qualify as a limited partnership.4 The 1943 agreement pro-
vided that the wife's standing as a creditor was subrogated to the rights
of the general creditors of taxpayer.5 This 6 and the right to share in
the profits indicate a joint venture or limited partnership.7 Since the
wife made a capital contribution, her failure to contribute services was
counterbalanced,8 and her share of the profits is taxable to her as income
from a joint venture,9 and not to taxpayer as part of his gross income.
On the other hand, the fact that the bonds had matured and were due,
thus enabling the wife to withdraw her money on demand, the wife's
1. Dorzback v. Collison, 93 F. Supp. 935 (D. Del. 1950).
2. "Deductions from gross income. In computing net income there shall be al-
lowed as deductions:
"(b) Interest. All interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebted-
ness, . . ." INT. REV. CoDE § 23(b).
3. Instant case at 69.
4. DEL. REv. CoDE § 3391, et seq. (1935). State laws and Federal tax laws are
not necessarily consistent as to what constitutes a partnership. See, MRTENs, LAW
OF FED. INC. TAX. §§ 35.02, 35.07 (1942); Bruton, Family Partnerships a id te
Income Tax, 98 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 143 (1949).
5. See the 1943 agreement, Brief for Appellants, p. 13a.
6. See Jordon Co. v. Allen, 85 F. Supp. 437 (M.D. Ga. 1949).
7. Ruppel v. Kuhl, 177 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1949) (under agreement to share
profits, taxpayer to supply services, wife the security, wife cosigned and secured
note enabling taxpayer to buy into a business; held, arrangement a joint venture);
Paul Cavanagh, 42 B.T.A. 1037 (1940), aff'd, 125 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1942) (tax-
payer's advance of $3500 to be used in business in profits of which taxpayer was to
share, held to be investment and not deductible as a bad debt). But cf. Kena v.
Comm'r, 44 B.T.A. 217 (1941) (for the purpose of declaring taxpayer a personal
holding company under § 351 (b) (1), the court held that receipt of a share in debtor's
profits in lieu of interest was interest received by taxpayer) ; Astoria Marine Con-
struction Co., T.C. Memo. Op., Dkt. 1868 (March 9, 1945) (taxpayer allowed to
deduct all losses 'of business although in addition to interest on a loan he was required
to share profits with creditor).
8. See MERTENs, op. cit. supra note 4, § 35.03.
9. INT. REv. CODE §§ 182, 3797. Even where a valid family partnership has been
set up, the Commissioner may reallocate the partnership income so that each receives
his proportionate share. Pub. Law No. 183, 82 Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 20, 1951).
See Packel, The Next Inning of Family Partnerships, 10O U. op PA. L R,.v. 153
(1950).
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lack of voice in the management lo and the fact that a prior partnership
plan had been rejected" all point toward a debtor-creditor relationship.
Deductibility under § 23(b) has been contingent upon the finding
of a bona fide debt and a legal liability to pay the interest deducted.'
2
Since § 23(b) contains no requirement that the debt be an "ordinary
and necessary" business expense, any enforceable debt is deemed bona
fide.' 8 Tested by this standard, the payments to the wife in the instant
case were held to be legitimately deducted under § 23(b). Thus it would
seem that a new method of reallocation of income has been sanctioned
by the case. Although reallocation of income between husband and wife
ordinarily has been of no importance since adoption of the split-income
provision in the Revenue Act of 1948,14 reallocation to other members
of taxpayer's family remains a tax-saving device.' 5 Previously, one method
of reallocation has been for taxpayer to make a substantial gift by means
of a sealed long term note and to deduct interest payments on the note
from his gross income.' 6 So long as the debt is enforceable the method
is effective, but it entails payment of a sizeable gift tax on the note.' 7 In
addition, the scheme can be utilized only in states in which sealed instru-
ments require no consideration for validity. By a literal reading of the
instant case, which allows deduction of exorbitant interest payments, a
taxpayer could now minimize the impact of the gift tax by giving a note
for a relatively small amount's but with a high rated interest. In states
where consideration is necessary to the validity of the debt, taxpayer could
borrow a small amount from the ope to whom he wishes to reallocate his
income, agree to a high rate of'interest and deduct the interest payments
from his gross income. Even if state usury laws were applied by the
courts' 9 to limit the amount of deductible interest they would not always
be helpful since they vary.P In addition, it is doubted that usury laws
10. Jordan Co. v. Allen, supra note 6.
11. Prior to the 1943 agreement a plan to take the wife into the business as a
partner was rejected as undesirable since it would subject her other investments to
the risks of the business. See taxpayer's testimony, Brief for Appellants, p. 16a.
The 1943 agreement specifically rejected the partnership relationship. Id. at p. 13a.
12. Baltimore & Ohio RR. v. Comm'r, 29 B.T.A. 368 (1933), aff'd, 78 F.2d
460 (4th Cir. 1935); Rob't Hays Smith, 5 P-H 1936 B.T.A. MEM. DE:c. 136,409.
13. Preston v. Comm'r, 132 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1942) ; Comm'r v. Parks, 113 F.2d
352 (3d Cir. 1940) (sealed note given without consideration in state where sealed
instruments are enforceable without consideration).
14. IxT. REv. CODE §§12(d), 51(b).
15. Distribution of income from one corporation to a commonly owned corpora-
tion as a tax saving device is prevented by INT. REv. CoDE § 45.
16. See, e.g., cases cited in note 13, supra.
17. INT. REv. CoDE § 1001.
18. The first $3,000 of gifts made to any one donee during a calendar year .is
excluded in determining the amount of taxable gifts for that year. U.S. Treas.
Reg. 108, §86.10 (1943).
19. Apparently state usury laws have not been applied by the courts in interpreting
§23(b), 1 CCH STAND. Fi. TAX. Rep. 171.283 (1952).
20. See, e.g., 3 ANN. L. OF MAss. c. 107 § 3, where there is apparently no statu-
tory maximum interest rate for loans over $1,000.
1952]
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would be applicable to situations such as the present case where. the
interest was in the form of a share of profits.
21
The circumstances pointing toward a bona fide debtor-creditor rela-
tionship in the instant case seem to be overwhelmed by the fact that in
1943 the debt apparently could have been paid off 22 so that there was no
need to increase the interest rate.23 The 1943 arrangement was not at
arm's length 24 and appears to have been a sham of the type "which has
been consistently rejected by the courts in determining Federal income
tax liability." 2 Also, in contemplating the definitions of "interest" laid
down in prior decisions 26 and the purpose of the Internal Revenue Code
to tax income at its source, these payments do not seem to fall within the
meaning of § 23(b). At least, the bona fide nature of the indebtedness
involved here does not seem to be so patent as to require a directed verdict
in the taxpayer's favor. Despite the apparent opportunity for tax avoid-
ance that a literal reading might attribute to this case,2 7 courts in the
future will no doubt continue to give close scrutiny to family arrange-
ments, and factors such as the interest rate and the necessity to pay
it 28 will be considered in determining the genuineness of the indebtedness
for tax purposes, rather than enforceability alone.
Tort Claims Act-
DISCRETIONARY EXCEPTION PRECLUDES FEDERAL
LIABILITY IN TEXAS CITY EXPLOSION
The United States War Department was ordered to produce fertilizer
grade ammonium nitrate for overseas relief shipment. In April, 1947,
a fire started in the hold of one of several ships loaded with fertilizer and
docked at Texas City, Texas. As a result two of the ships exploded,
21. See, e.g., Andrews v. Andrews, 170 Minn. 175, 212 N.W. 408 (1927).
22. Taxpayer reported income of $21,800 in 1942, $17,800 of which was realized
from the business, Brief for Appellants, p. 22a.
23. Taxpayer's business had been solvent since 1938; and his average annual
reported income was approximately $10,500 in the years 1938-1942. See taxpayer's
testimony, Brief for Appellants, p. 22a. The going rate of interest in the community
was 5% in 1941, ibid, and presumably it was close to that in 1943, there being no
evidence to the contrary.
24. At the trial taxpayer admitted that he would not enter such an agreement
with anyone else, Brief for Appellants, p. 23a.
25. Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Comm'r, 16 T.C. 882, 890 (1952), and cases
cited therein.
26. ". . . the words of the statute [§ 23(b)] . . . do not refer to some
esoteric concept derived from subtle and theoretic analysis." Old Colony R. Co.
v. Comm'r, 284 U.S. 552, 561 (1932). "In the business world interest on indebted-
ness means compensation for the use or forbearance of money." Deputy v. Du Pont,
308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940).
27. In fact the court in the instant case was not called upon to determine de-
ductibility under § 23(b) but only to determine whether the payments were taxable
to the husband. The decision that they were not could be rested on the ground that
the wife was a joint venturer.
28. See Preston v. Comm'r, supra note 13 (L. Hand, concurring opinion).
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causing extensive property damage, personal injuries and the deaths of
560 persons.1  In a consolidated suit 2 under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia,8 that the United States was liable, to
the same extent as a private corporation manufacturing an inherently
dangerous commodity, for (1) specified negligent or wrongful acts or
omissions of its officers or employees acting within the scope of their
employment 4 and (2) unspecified negligence under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
In reversing the district court's judgment for the plaintiffs, the court
of appeals held that the Government was immune from liability because
(1) the specified acts of negligence came within an exception which pro-
vides that the Act shall not apply to claims based "upon the exercise or
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function
or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused," 5 and (2) any un-
specified negligence did not come within the requirement of the Act that
a claim be based upon "the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government." 0 Re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197
F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. granted, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 3128 (Nov.
11, 1952).
Traditionally an act of the legislature relinquishing the immunity
of the sovereign received a literal and narrow construction by the courts.
7
However, the Supreme Court when interpreting the Federal Tort Claims
Act has on at least two occasions 8 quoted with approval Justice Cardozo's
statement: "The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship
enough, where consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor
1. Total claims amount to over $200,000,000. See Petition for Certiorari, p. 8.
2. There were approximately 273 suits by 8,485 plaintiffs. It is not a matter of
record what proportion of the claims are subrogated.
3. Other arguments advanced by the plaintiffs were: (3) the United States was
negligent simply in undertaking to manufacture the fertilizer, "a known dangerous
explosive and fire hazard"; (4) the United States was liable for a public or private
nuisance in causing an inherently dangerous and ultrahazardous explosive material
to be concentrated without warning in a populated area; (5) the United States was
liable for the negligence of the Coast Guard in failing to supervise the stowage of the
fertilizer aboard the ship and in fighting the fire. The instant court ruled against
the plaintiffs on all counts.
4. The specific acts involved decisions to coat the ammonium nitrate with a car-
bonaceous material, and to bag it at excessively high temperatures and in paper bags,
thus increasing the risk of spontaneous combustion. Responsibility for these decisions
vas placed on numerous army officers and civilians in positions of widely varying
responsibility including the Army Chief of Ordnance, who allegedly was aware
of all these dangers but took no steps to assure himself that it was safe to concen-
trate the fertilizer in Texas City; and a safety engineer at one of the plants, who
allegedly was also aware of the danger but did nothing.
5. 60 STAT. 845 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (Supp. 1951).
6. 60 STAT. 844 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. 1951).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941) (Tucker Act).
8. See United States v. Aetna Casualty & Insurance Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383
(1949) ; United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 554 (1951).
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by reinforcement of construction where consent has been announced." 9
Past judicial interpretations of the discretionary exception to the Act
have not uniformly reflected Cardozo's approach.10 One court has said
that the word "discretionary" in the Act conveyed the same meaning as
traditionally accorded it by the courts." But it is questionable whether
the considerations that led to granting immunity from mandamus 12 or
personal liability '3 to individual officers should be controlling in a statute
involving a waiver of governmental immunity. The individual liability
of a government official or the judicial prescription of executive conduct
is not involved here. Nevertheless, on the rationale of these older cases,
the discretionary exception has been interpreted to result in immunity
for the United States where the basis of the claim was an official's decision
of a regulatory or administrative nature. For example, in Chournos v.
United States14 it was held that the decision of range officials not to grant
the plaintiff permission to cross public lands with his sheep was a decision
within the exception. In Sickman v. United States 15 the plaintiff sought
to recover for the destruction of his crops by migratory birds which were
under the protection of the United States. The court held, inter alia,
that in determining whether migratory birds might be hunted and killed
in a particular year, the Secretary of the Interior performed a discretionary
function. In Denny v. United States "0 an army officer and his wife sought
to recover for the death of their child who, they alleged, was stillborn due
to the failure of an Army Hospital to dispatch an ambulance. The court
held that since the Army Medical Department rendered such services
only "whenever practicable," the decision not to send the ambulance was
covered by the discretionary exception. However, where the Army Med-
ical Department had exercised its discretion to render treatment and
rendered the treatment negligently, the United States was held liable.17
This last case approaches the principal area in which disagreement
exists as to the scope of the discretionary exception. Once the discretion
has been exercised to undertake a project, the question arises whether all
decisions effectuating the project by various officials in the chain of
command are covered by the discretionary exception. For example, in
Boyce v. United States18 the plaintiff's lands were damaged by blasting
9. Anderson v. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30
(1926).
10. Compare Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430, 431 (N.D. Ala. 1949)
with Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951).
11. Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
12. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (U.S. 1838) (mandamus).
13. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (suit against postmaster).
14. 193 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1951).
15. 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950).
16. 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948).
17. Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950).
18. 93 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
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operations in the course of a project to deepen the Missouri River. The
court held that since the blasting was part of the over-all plan approved
by the Chief of Engineers of the Army, it was a decision made in .the
exercise of a discretionary function and it was immaterial whether or not
there was negligence. In contrast with this view is Somerset Seafood Co.
v. United States 19 in which the proper distance of a buoy from a wreck
was in issue. The court said that even if the decision to mark or remove
the wreck be regarded as discretionary, there is liability for negligence in
the marking once the decision to do so has been made. This case, in-
dicative of the minority view, 20 is in accord with the concurring opinion
in the instant case, that while the decision whether or not a project should
be undertaken or what broad policies should be followed in executing it
may be discretionary, if a discretionary project is undertaken, then the
United States is held to due care in its execution to the same extent as a
private person. 2 '
The legislative history of the discretionary exception indicates that
in its present form 22 it supplanted a provision which stated that the Act
would not apply to any claim for damages caused by the administration
of any law by either the FTC or by the SEC.2 The decisions of those
commissions do not involve governmental projects such as that in the
instant case, but are regulatory in nature. The change in the wording
might suggest that Congress intended to bring similar regulatory decisions
by all governmental employees within the discretionary exception, but it
hardly suggests the substantially different idea that the exception was
meant to extend to all non-regulatory decisions made in carrying out
government projects. 24 The final House Report states that the exception,
as enacted, was ". . . designed to preclude application of the bill to a
claim against a regulatory agency, such as the Federal Trade Commission
or the Securities and Exchange Commission, based upon an alleged abuse
of discretionary authority by an officer or employee, whether or not negli-
19. 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951).
20. See Note, 19 A.L.R.(2d) 845 (1951).
21. Instant case at 781. Judge Strum concurred on the ground that the evidence
showed faulty stowage by the shipper, and not defective manufacture by the Govern-
ment, to have been the cause of the explosion. Cf. A/S Rederi v. Accinanto, Ltd.,
199 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1952) (explosion of Government manufactured ammonium
nitrate fertilizer aboard ship in Belgian port found caused by spontaneous combustion
due to improper stowage).
22. See text at note 5 supra.
23. Hearings before Committee on, The Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1942).
24. The need for this change was indicated in an earlier discussion of the bill,
between Senator Danaher and Mr. Holtzoff of the Department of Justice, in which
Senator Danaher suggested that the original provision was not clear. Mr. Holtzoff
agreed that the section could be clarified and its phraseology improved. He stated
that the thought behind the section was that if the Federal Trade Commission issued
a cease and desist order and the court later held that it was erroneously issued,
the Government should not be liable to a claim on the part of such party that his
business was damaged by the cease and desist order. Hearings before Subcommittee
of Committee on The Judiciary on S. Res. 2690, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 48-49 (1940).
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gence is alleged to have been involved."2 5 An interpretation limiting the
exception to regulatory or administrative decisions would prevent the
Government from utilizing this protection at all where the execution of
a manufacturing project is involved. The Government would then be
forced to rely on a related but separate exception in the Act for "any
claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government
exercising due care in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or
not such statute or regulation be valid . . ." -6 The final House Report
states that this clause was ". . . intended to preclude any possibility that
the bill might be construed to authorize suit for damages against the
Government growing out of an authorized activity, such as flood-control
or irrigation projects, where no negligence on the part of any government
agent is shown . . ." 27 A fertilizer manufacturing project would appear
to be such an "authorized activity" within the intended coverage of the
"statutory" exception (and not a "regulatory agency" covered by the
"discretionary" exception). As indicated, the exception affords the Gov-
ernment protection unless it is shown that due care has not been exercised.
Under this exception the Government would be liable only when acts and
decisions of its employees made in carrying out a project would be con-
sidered negligent if made by private persons in carrying out similar
projects.
In addition, the plaintiffs contended that the Government should be
liable to the same extent as a private manufacturer for its unspecified
negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Act provides
that the various district courts shall have jurisdiction for claims caused
".. . by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable. . " 28
By interpreting this section to require proof of "some definite act of com-
mission or omission on the part of some particular employee," 2 9 the court
ruled out application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against the Gov-
ernment under the Act. While the court has some support for its posi-
tion 30 most courts have rejected this unnecessarily restrictive interpreta-
tion. Thus in United States v. Hull 31 it was held that to recover under
the Act it was not necessary to specify which employee was at fault. In
that case a window at one of the stamp counters in a post office dropped
on the plaintiff's fingers and the court held that it was a routine case for
the application of res ipsa loquitur. In United States v. Johnson32 that
doctrine was applied where a car in which the plaintiff was riding over-
25. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1942) (emphasis added).
26. 60 STAT. 845 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §2680(a) (Supp. 1951).
27. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1942) (emphasis added).
28. See note 6 supra.
29. Instant case at 779.
30. Sickman v. United States, 184 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950).
31. 195 F.2d 64 (1st Cir. 1952).
32. 181 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1950).
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turned, the court having determined that the sailor who drove the car was
acting within the scope of his employment. In D'Anna v. United States 3
where the plaintiffs were injured by an auxiliary gas tank which fell from
a naval airplane, the court held that res ipsa was applicable.
The utilization of the doctrine in these relatively simple cases has
allowed the judge 34 to infer from the circumstantial evidence that a
Government employee caused the accident. Assuming in the instant case
that all the specified acts of negligence were covered by the discretionary
exception, utilization of res ipsa would require the court to decide whether
the damages were legally attributable to the excluded negligence, to the
unspecified negligence of unknown lesser employees, or to both.3 5 Sincc
a judge could make these distinctions without impairing the discretionary
exception, it is in accordance with the policy of the act that he should.
In summary, in at least three respects the instant decision presents
questionable interpretations of the Federal Tort Claims Act. First, appli-
cation of the discretionary exception to all decisions made by government
employees in the execution of broad policies formulated near the top of
the governmental hierarchy reads much of the substance out of the
statutory waiver of immunity. Second, application of the discretionary
exception to the execution of non-regulatory projects, such as the manu-
facture of fertilizer, cannot readily be reconciled with the legislative history.
Third, preventing the application of res ipsa loquitur against the Govern-
ment, appears to have little basis in case law or in forwarding the liberal
purposes of the statute. The net effect of these constructions is to remove
the United States, when a manufacturer, from the tort liability of a private
manufacturer.
Trusts-
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ACT DOES NOT PREVENT
RESULTING TRUST IN AUTOMOBILE
Pursuant to an oral agreement, defendant as agent for the plaintiff
purchased a truck with the certificate of title issued in the name of the
defendant. Upon defendant's refusal at a later date to turn over the
truck, plaintiff brought an action to have legal title transferred and have
33. 181 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1950).
34. In suits under the Tort Claims Act, the judge sits without jury. 60 STAT.
844 (1946), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §2402 (Supp. 1951).
35. As a practical matter it appears that the plaintiffs will derive little advantage
from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the instant case. In order to establish a
prima facie case, the plaintiffs will have to introduce expert testimony bearing on
the improbability of the explosion occuring without negligence. See Judson v. Giant
Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020 (1895) (explosion of nitro-glycerine in
dynamite factory). The most persuasive presentation of such technological evidence,
in view of the apparently readily available direct evidence, would entail reconstruction
of possible conditions at Texas City sufficient to cause this explosion.
19521
426 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
the defendant declared trustee of a purchase money resulting trust. The
lower court found for the defendant, basing its decision on the Ohio
Certificate of Title Act which provides in part that no court shall recognize
the interest of any person in any motor vehicle unless evidenced by a
certificate of title.' The court of appeals reversed, holding that, in passing
the act, the legislature was concerned with legal title and not beneficial
interests and that the statute was not intended to make it impossible to
set up an enforceable trust with the motor vehicle as the res. Douglas v.
Hubbard, 91 Ohio App. 200, 107 N.E.2d 884 (1951).
Motor vehicle certificate of title acts, in force in thirty-three juris-
dictions, vary from state to state, but in their most complete form provide
for the recording on the certificate of all encumbrances or changes in title
of the vehicle.2 Most states having certificate of title laws make it a mis-
demeanor to buy or sell an automobile without transferring the certificate
of title but do not expressly render the transaction void where the cer-
tificate is not transferred.8 A few, Ohio among them, expressly prevent
title from passing until the certificate is transferred. Since title acts are
primarily designed to prevent fraudulent sales and sales of stolen motor
vehicles, 4 Ohio courts have adhered to the strict wording of the statute
in cases involving a bona fide purchaser who has relied on a clear and
valid certificate of title in buying a car which was subject to an unrecorded
encumbrance.5 The rights of a bona fide purchaser have also been held
superior to those of one who allowed the certificate of title to be in the
name of another -who also had possession of the car.6 However, the
court has refused to protect a purchaser who relied on a certificate of title
acquired from the state by fraud, on the theory that to do so would be to
aid the very thing which the title act was intended to prevent.
7
In the instant case the court used the doctrine of a resulting trust
to find an interest in one not having the certificate of title. A prior Mis-
souri decision had held that a statute, approximating Ohio's requiring the
certificate of title to be transferred at the time a sale is made, precluded
a finding of a constructive trust in favor of the buyer when the certificate
1. OEio GEN. CoDs ANN. § 6290-4 (1945).
2. See Note, The Impact of Automobile Certificate of Title Laws on Ownership
and Encumbrance, 36 MINN. L. REv. 77 (1951); Legis., WAsH. U.L.Q. 539 (1951).
3. For a discussion of the rights of parties in illegal sales of automobiles under
certificate of title acts, see Note, 2 BAYLOR L. REv. 97 (1949).
4. See the statement of the reasons for the Legislation in 117 Ohio Laws 373
(1937-38).
5. Kelly Kar Co. v. Finkler, 155 Ohio St. 541, 99 N.E.2d 665 (1951) (condi-
tional sales contract); Schiefer v. Schnaufer, 71 Ohio App. 431, 50 N.E.2d 365
(1943) (mechanic's lien).
6. Kattwinkel v. Kattwinkel, 80 Ohio App. 397, 74 N.E.2d 418 (1947). Also,
under OHio GEN. CODE ANN. § 6290-9 (1945), the holder of a manufacturer's cer-
tificate of title and a chattel mortgage has a claim superior to that of a subsequent
purchaser. Associates Investment Co. v. LeBoutillier, 69 Ohio App. 62, 42 N.E.2d
1011 (1941); Crawford Finance Co. v. Derby, 63 Ohio App. 50, 25 N.E.2d 306
(1939).
7. Associate Discount Corp. v. Colonial Finance Co., 88 Ohio App. 205, 98
N.E.2d 848 (1950) ; Mock v. Kaffits, 75 Ohio App. 305, 62 N.E.2d 172 (1944).
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was not so transferred.8 However, as between the purchaser and his
agent, the courts have suggested that a resulting trust might be recognized
if there were a sufficiently high degree of proof to rebut the prima facie
evidence of title furnished by the agent's possession of the certificate.9
Variations in title statutes "o may require local qualifications, but generally
it would appear that to further the policy of the title acts, a court should
require very clear proof of a resulting trust in an automobile; but the
same policy should not entirely preclude the existence of such a trust
where the statute is being used as an instrument of fraud, except where
an innocent third party has relied on the certificate.:" No such interest
is present in the instant case. In view of the previous decisions of the
Ohio court and the doctrine that a trust may be cut off if the trustee
transfers to a purchaser for value and in good faith,'12 it seems highly
unlikely that the holding of this case would be extended to a situation where
the resulting trustee sells to a bona fide purchaser. Such a case would
conflict with a specific purpose of the act. But the decision in the instant
case is not likely to weaken the Act's effectiveness.
8. Hoshaw v. Fenton, 232 Mo. App. 137, 110 S.W.2d 1140 (1937). The statute
expressly renders void any sale where the certificate is not transferred.
9. Dee v. Sutter 222 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. App. 1949); Majors v. Majors, 349 Pa.
334, 37 A.2d 528 (1944).
10. E.g., the Michigan statute is worded specifically to protect "subsequent pur-
chasers or mortgagees" against unrecorded liens. MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 1497
(1952).
11. See Willard H. George, Ltd. v. Barnett, 65 Cal. App.2d 828, 150 P.2d
591 (1944). Creditor could not attach automobile registered in the name of the
debtor, who was a trustee under a resulting trust, in the absence of a showing that the
creditor had relied on debtor's ownership of the vehicle in extending credit. The
California Title Act is similar to Ohio's. CAL. VEHIcLE CODE ANN. § 186 (1948).
12. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §408 (1935).
